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"MIDSTREAM" INCORPORATION CONSIDERATIONS
— by Neil E. Harl*
The basic requirements for a tax-free incorporation are rela-
tively mechanical—1 (1) the transfer must be solely for stock in
the corporation2 and (2) the transferors must be "in control" of
the corporation immediately after the exchange.3  This requires
that the transferors end up with at least 80 percent of the com-
bined voting power of all classes of voting stock and at least 80
percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock.4
Even though those requirements are met, the incorporation of
a farm or ranch may encounter a "midstream" incorporation chal-
lenge from IRS.5  Such challenges typically involve a degree of
distortion in tax reporting, often because incorporation occurs
some time during a production cycle with deductible costs
separated from revenue with respect to a particular enterprise.
General rule.  In general, formation of a farm or ranch
corporation in the regular course of business in a tax-free
exchange that does not involve substantial tax avoidance motives
or a manifest desire to shift income tax liability artificially should
not result in recognition of income because of conveyance of
stored or growing crops, supplies or livestock not yet ready for
sale.6  Thus, in a 1982 letter ruling, IRS approved a tax-free
transfer of cash, machinery and equipment, growing crops, prepaid
expenses, live cattle, feed on hand and supplies.7  A 1984 letter
ruling, involving transfer of a Commodity Credit Corporation
loan and payment-in-kind program benefits to a corporation, did
not require any reallocation of expenses or income.8  These
rulings provide substantial comfort to those concerned about
possible challenges by the Internal Revenue Service.
Areas of possible challenge.  Nonetheless, IRS may
pursue any one of four major theories in challenging tax-free
exchanges.9  In most instances, challenges have been successful if
the distortion was significant or there was evidence the distortion
was deliberate.
Assignment of income.  The assignment of income doc-
trine may override an otherwise tax-free exchange and result in the
taxation of the proceeds of later sale of the transferred asset back
to the transferor.10  In a leading case on assignment of income,
Adolph Weinberg,11 a farmer who was preparing to retire from
farming directed tax advisors to form 14 separate corporations to
receive crop sale proceeds.  The attempt to reduce income tax
liability by creating 14 corporate taxpayers was unsuccessful.
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Reallocation by Commissioner.  The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue has broad powers to reallocate income, deduc-
tions, credits or allowances as necessary "in order to prevent the
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect...income."12  In a leading
reallocation case, Rooney v. United States,13 the Commissioner
was upheld in reallocating to the newly formed corporation
production expenses incurred by the individual taxpayer.  The case
involved a July 31 transfer of a growing hop crop (which had been
sold under a forward contract the prior January 22) to the new
corporation with the crop harvested in late August and early
September.  Before the Commissioner's reallocation, the individ-
ual taxpayer had incurred a substantial net operating loss which
the taxpayer sought to carry back three years.  In Central Cuba
Sugar Co. v. Commissioner,14 a corporation transferred growing
sugar cane to a subsidiary immediately before harvest with sub-
stantial losses for the parent corporation.  Again, reallocation to
avoid distortion of income was upheld.  In a 1983 letter ruling,15
expenses were reallocated to the transferee corporation where
substantial net operating losses were incurred by the transferor.
In two 1983 U.S. District Court cases, IRS was not upheld in
attempting to reallocate expenses to avoid what IRS perceived was
distortion in tax reporting.  In Fanning v. United States,16 the
transfer of assets to a newly formed farm corporation was tax-free
even though the transferor incurred $18,114 in crop expense.  The
Commissioner's attempt to reallocate crop expense to the
corporation was rejected, with the court noting that no operating
loss had been generated and banking considerations influenced the
timing of the transfer.  A similar result was reached in Heaton v .
United States.17  In that case, the court did not approve realloca-
tion as to income from grain transferred to a newly formed corpo-
ration.  The transfer did not generate a net operating loss.
The cases and rulings to date would suggest that the probabili-
ties of a successful challenge to a transfer are substantially higher
if a significant loss results from the transfer.
Tax benefit challenge.  Under the "tax benefit" challenge,
if a taxpayer makes an expenditure or suffers a loss for which a
deduction is claimed and the taxpayer later recovers the funds or
the property, the amount must be reported as income.18  The tax
benefit rule has been applied only rarely in the tax-free exchange
area.19
Lack of business purpose.  Occasionally, tax-free
exchanges have been challenged on the grounds of lack of a
business purpose and no purpose other than tax avoidance.20  An
attempted tax-free exchange of only stored crops may fall into that
category.
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(1990).
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8 Ltr. Rul. 8431032, no date given.
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Comm'r v. Sugar Daddy, Inc., 386 F.2d
836 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 929 (1968).
1 1 Id.
1 2 I.R.C. § 482.
1 3 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962).
1 4 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 874 (1952).
1 5 Ltr. Rul. 8351003, Aug. 23, 1983.
1 6 586 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Wash. 1983).
1 7 573 F.2d 12 (E.D. Wash. 1983).
1 8 See, e.g., Connery v. U.S., 460 F.2d
1130 (3d Cir. 1972) (prepaid advertising).
1 9 See Nash v. U.S., 398 U. S. 1 (1970)
(involving bad debt reserves).
2 0 Cf. Rev. Rul. 60-331, 1960-2 C.B. 189.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
ANIMALS
FENCES. The plaintiff sued the
defendant for injury to himself and his
mares from the defendant's stallions which
escaped from the defendant's fenced
property and broke through the plaintiff's
fence to reach the mares.  The plaintiff
injured his achilles' heel in attempting to
capture the stallions.  The court held that
the defendant was liable for the injuries to
the mares even though the plaintiff failed
to show that the county had passed a stock
election law requiring livestock owners to
fence in there livestock, because the plain-
tiff had an adequate fence around the mares.
The defendant was held not liable for the
injury to the plaintiff's heel because the
injury was not foreseeable from the escape
of the stallions.  Gray v. Davis, 7 9 2
S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
DISCHARGE.  The debtor sold a trac-
tor at a yard sale without prior consent of
the creditor who held a security interest in
the tractor.  The court held that the inten-
tional and unauthorized sale of the tractor
collateral was a "willful and malicious"
injury to the property of the creditor and
the claim for the loan secured by the trac-
tor was nondischargeable.  The court held
that the creditor did not have to prove
specific intent by the debtor to harm the
creditor.  In re Thomas, 116 B . R .
287 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS.  The
debtor had entered into an agricultural
equipment lease for a silo and accessories.
The debtor did not assume or reject the
equipment lease and the lessor petitioned
the court for administrative expenses for
the rental of the silo from the date of
bankruptcy filing to the date of its petition
for rejection of the lease.  The debtor
argued that the silo was broken and not
used since before the filing for bankruptcy.
The court held that because the silo was
broken and of no use to the estate, the
administrative expense for rent was denied
under Section 503(b) because the rental of
the silo was not a necessary expense of
preserving the estate.  Kinnan &
Kinnan Partnership v. Agristor
Leasing, 116 B.R. 162 (D. Neb.
1990) .
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor claimed
an interest in an IRA as exempt under
Section 522(d)(10)(E).  The court held that
the IRA was exempt as a "similar plan"
and because the amount in the IRA was
reasonably necessary for the debtor's sup-
port.  In re  Cilek, 115 B.R. 9 7 4
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).
The debtor's interest in an ERISA
qualified profit-sharing plan was held to be
estate property an not eligible for an
exemption as a spendthrift trust.  The
court also held that the anti-alienation
provisions of ERISA invalidated a
creditor's security interest in the plan
proceeds.  The debtor's employer was
ordered to turnover the plan funds to the
trustee who was ordered to use the funds
first to pay any federal taxes resulting
from the distribution of the funds.  In re
Green, 115 B.R. 1001 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1990).
The debtors' interests in an ERISA
qualified plan were held not included in the
debtors' bankruptcy estates because the
plan was a spendthrift trust where the plan
absolutely prohibited alienation of 90 per-
cent of the plan and prohibited irrevocable
assignments of the remaining 10 percent.
In re  LeFeber, 906 F.2d 330 (7th
Cir. 1990).
The self-employed debtor's interest in
an IRA was held exempt under Wis. Stat.
§ 815.18(31).  The court rejected, how-
ever, the debtor's argument that property
would be exempt merely upon the failure
of the trustee to timely object to the
claimed exemption.  The court held that
the exemption must be allowed by law
before the failure of the trustee to object
will result in allowance of the exemption.
Apparently, the court's holding means that
objections to claimed exemptions may be
made at any time.  In re  Staniforth,
116 B.R. 127 (Bankr. W.D. W i s .
1990) .
The debtor's interest in a pension fund
was held to be a spendthrift trust under
Michigan law and therefore excluded from
the bankruptcy estate.  Under the pension
plan, the debtor could receive payments
only upon retirement and the debtor had no
right to borrow from the plan, require
distributions for hardship or obtain distri-
butions upon termination of employment
other than retirement.  Jacobs v .
Shields, 116 B.R. 134 (D. Minn.
1990) .
The court held that the Missouri
exemption for ERISA qualified pension
plans to the extent necessary for the
support of the debtor was not pre-empted
by ERISA and the retired debtor was
entitled to exempt payments from the
plan.  In re  Vickers, 116 B.R. 1 4 9
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990).
The debtors filed their declaration of
homestead for their residence and aban-
donment of their former residence one day
after filing bankruptcy.  Under Washing-
ton law, a debtor may filed a declaration of
homestead up to the date of sale of the
residence and still claim a homestead
